I. INTRODUCTION
In the fight against trademark infringement, brand owners have in recent years adopted a new tactic: bringing suit against the individuals responsible for the manufacture and sale of counterfeit goods.
1 Because defendants in these lawsuits sometimes fail to appear in court, plaintiffs instead seek the profits made by these counterfeiters as a remedy. 2 In several recent cases, luxury brands Tiffany and Gucci have done just this. As part of discovery, Tiffany and Gucci requested several defendants' bank records from Chinese-owned banks to determine the profits made by the defendants. 3 The banks challenged these discovery requests, forcing the courts to address whether the Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Evidence Convention) or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) should be used to order evidence disclosure from non-party Chinese banks. however, led to inconsistent outcomes despite similar circumstances and, in some instances, identical evidence. However, the analysis in the Tiffany cases came to the most workable conclusion: courts should "forebear from assuming that the Hague Evidence Convention is not a viable option until Chinese authorities have had a meaningful opportunity to comply with similar requests but have failed to do so." 14 Part II of this paper will discuss the legal background and courts' analysis of the Tiffany and Gucci cases. Part II will also look at the laws and legal opinions governing evidence disclosure abroad for use in United States litigation as well as Chinese laws on judicial assistance and banking privacy. Part III will discuss the problems with the current analysis as it is applied to non-party Chinese banks in these cases. The current analysis permits a pro-forum bias and places courts in the position of weighing the relative interests of the United States and foreign sovereigns. Part III will argue that the resolution in the Tiffany cases was the ideal result. Giving China a chance to comply with a Hague Evidence Convention request best serves the interests of both the United States and China while remaining sensitive to the interests of the parties involved in the suit.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Methods of Foreign Discovery in United States Courts
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The Federal Rules govern the discovery process in United States federal courts. Under Federal Rule 26, parties to the litigation, without the use of an intermediary, may "obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." 15 While the Federal Rules provide standards for gathering a number of different types of evidence, the cases involved in this analysis involve requests to produce documents served on non-parties. Federal Rule 45 governs the use of subpoenas to compel non-parties to a lawsuit to produce documents. 16 A subpoena may command the person on whom it is served to "produce designated documents, electronically stored 14 20 was intended to bridge the gap between common law and civil law jurisdictions, 21 and "establish a system for obtaining evidence located abroad that would be 'tolerable' to the state executing the request and would produce evidence 'utilizable' in the requesting state." 22 One issue which causes particular contention is pretrial discovery, particularly the "aggressive" nature of American-style discovery. 23 Common law jurisdictions, like the United States, use an adversary system to litigate cases, 24 and parties to the lawsuit are responsible for collecting and presenting evidence to support their arguments. 25 Because this system is based on the idea "that each party will have an equal ability to discover the evidence in his favor," parties use pretrial discovery to equalize their access to evidence. 26 This is in stark contrast to civil law jurisdictions, in which parties are only responsible for their own cases and are not obligated to produce adverse information for the other party. 27 Additionally, the judge in civil law jurisdictions plays a primary role in bringing forth relevant evidence. COMPLY 193 Thus, pretrial discovery, as used in the American system, is often seen as an affront to the sovereignty and operation of courts in civil law jurisdictions.
29
In order to address these differences, the Hague Evidence Convention provides three methods by which signatories may conduct evidence disclosure in foreign states: (1) letters of request, (2) use of a diplomatic or consular agent, or (3) use of a private commissioner. 
A letter of request (also known as a letter rogatory) is
[a] document issued by one court to a foreign court, requesting that the foreign court (1) take evidence from a specific person within the foreign jurisdiction or serve process on an individual or corporation within the foreign jurisdiction and (2) return the testimony or proof of service for use in a pending case. Chapter II of the Hague Evidence Convention covers the taking of evidence by diplomatic officers and consular agents, as well as commissioners. Diplomatic officers and consular agents may take evidence from nationals of the state they represent. 37 They may also take evidence from nationals of their host state as long as a competent authority grants permission and they abide by the rules of that permission.
BLACK'S LAW
38 Persons appointed as commissioners may take evidence abroad without compulsion and with the permission of a competent authority, granted they follow the conditions of the permission. 39 In addition to these methods of taking evidence, Article 23 of the Convention allows a contracting state to "declare that it will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery documents as known in Common Law countries."
40
China acceded to the Hague Evidence Convention in 1997 and designated the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) as its central authority. 41 While China is a signatory to the Hague Evidence Convention, it included a number of reservations as part of its accession to the treaty. 42 First, Chapter II is not applicable with the exception of Article 15, which authorizes diplomatic officers or consular agents to take evidence from nationals of the state they represent. 43 Second, in accordance with Article 23, China has declared it will only execute such requests for pretrial discovery when the documents are clearly enumerated in the letters of request and those documents have a "direct and close State of execution claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action or that its internal law would not admit a right of action on it. 66 Under Article 73, a commercial bank that illegally discloses information about, freezes, or debits a deposit account is subject to a number of penalties depending on the damage caused. 67 In cases where there have been no illegal gains, the "banking regulatory organ of the State Council" shall impose a fine of no less than ￥50,000 renminbi to no more than ￥500,000 renminbi.
68
The Notice of the People's Bank of China on Promulgating the Provisions on the Administration of Financial Institutions' Assistance in the Inquiry, Freeze or Deduction of Deposits (Financial Institutions' Assistance Provisions) provides the conditions under which certain financial institutions-including wholly state-owned commercial banks-can disclose depositor information, freeze accounts, or debit funds from accounts. 69 A notice of a request for disclosure must be served by an officer of a competent organ, and financial organs are prohibited from accepting notices served by anyone other than an officer of a competent organ. 70 The regulation provides a list of authorities who are competent to request such information. The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China also provides penalties for entities that disclose private banking information. 73 Under Article 253(A), a financial entity that illegally discloses private information on citizens in the course of its duties is subject to punishment if the circumstances are serious. 74 These penalties include imprisonment or criminal detention of no more than three years, fines, or both.
75
C. Recent Cases Involving Discovery Requests Directed at Non-Party Chinese Banks
The Southern District of New York has recently decided a number of cases involving trademark suits brought by American corporations against Chinese counterfeiters. In each case, the plaintiffs attempted to compel discovery of bank records from non-party Chinese banks under the Federal Rules, and the banks asked the court to instead use the Hague Evidence Convention due to conflicts between the Federal Rules and internal Chinese law. Following the ruling in Aerospatiale, the judges applied a five-factor comity analysis, plus two additional factors used in the Southern District, 76 to determine whether to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules or the Hague Evidence Convention. Despite almost identical circumstances, the courts in these cases reached different conclusions on how to conduct the requested discovery. hosted in the United States. 77 Tiffany served a subpoena pursuant to Federal Rule 45 on the New York branches of the Bank of China (BOCNY), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBCNY), and China Merchants Bank (CMBNY) for records related to the defendants' accounts. 78 All three banks searched their records held in the United States but were unable to find any documents matching the information provided by the plaintiffs. 79 The banks also claimed that records kept outside of the United States were beyond their "custody[] or control," 80 and that producing such documents held in China would violate Chinese law. 81 Both BOCNY and IBCNY did, however, offer to assist the plaintiffs in preparing a discovery request pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention.
82
The plaintiffs moved to compel production of the documents. 83 In response, the banks opposed the motion, arguing they did not "have custody or control of documents located in China" and the "plaintiffs' motion should be denied in accordance with notions of comity."
84
The court dismissed the banks' first argument finding the records held in China were within the New York branches' custody and control. 85 Next, the court turned to the issues of comity raised by the banks. The banks contended that compliance with the subpoena would require violating several Chinese laws-specifically, China's banking privacy laws. 86 Because of this conflict of laws, the court engaged in the five-factor comity analysis mentioned in Aerospatiale, along with two additional factors used in the Southern District, to determine whether the banks should be compelled to produce the documents under the Federal On the first and second factors of the comity analysis (importance of the documents to the litigation and the specificity of the request), the court found in favor of the plaintiffs-the information requested was important because it could reveal the identities of counterfeiters and other defendants, and the document request was sufficiently specific. 88 The third factor (origin of information) weighed in favor of the banks because the Chinese bank records clearly originated outside the United States. 89 While the first three factors of the analysis were relatively straightforward in this case, the analysis of the fourth and fifth factors proved more contentious. The fourth factor of the comity analysis required the court to determine if there was an alternative means to the Federal Rules of securing the information requested. 90 In support of their argument, the plaintiffs cited language which had previously been posted on the United States Department of State website stating:
While it is possible to request compulsion of evidence in China pursuant to a letter rogatory or letter of request (Hague Evidence Convention), such requests have not been particularly successful in the past. Requests may take more than a year to execute. It is not unusual for no reply to be received or after a considerable time has elapsed, for Chinese authorities to request clarification from the American court with no indication that the request will eventually be executed.
91
In response, the banks argued this language was not necessarily indicative of the current treatment of Hague Evidence Convention requests in China. First, they noted this language had since been removed from the website. 92 While the State Department did not provide its reason for the removal, the banks claimed the removal suggested the State Department no longer regarded the information as accurate. 93 In further support of their argument, the banks also cited statistics on the MOJ website reporting China had executed approximately fifty percent of the letters of request it had received in the past five years, with Both the plaintiffs and the banks provided expert opinions in support of their positions. 97 Many of the proffered opinions relied on either the language removed from the State Department website or the statistics provided by the MOJ. 98 After review, the court concluded the experts were interpreting the same empirical evidence in different ways; thus, their opinions did not push the analysis in favor of either party. 99 The court was ultimately unpersuaded by the plaintiffs' arguments that requests for evidence disclosure under the Hague Evidence Convention would be "futile" and found the fourth factor in favor of the banks.
100
The fifth factor required the court to balance United States' interests involved in the case against foreign sovereign interests. 101 The banks contended, "China has a significant interest in enforcing its banking privacy laws" because such laws are necessary to create confidence in China's relatively new banking system. 102 The plaintiffs countered by arguing the "United States interest in fully and fairly adjudicating matters before its courts . . . outweighs [a foreign country's interest] in protecting the confidentiality of its banking customers' records." 103 The plaintiffs also argued that the United States has a significant interest in enforcing its trademark laws. 104 The court ultimately found in favor of the banks, noting that Chinese banking laws "have few exceptions and appear to 94 
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A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO COMPLY 203 provide harsh consequences for violations." 105 The court also found the banks' status as non-parties swayed this factor in their favor. 106 The court continued with the two additional factors used by the Southern District in a comity analysis: the nature of the hardship (sixth factor) and the good faith of the party resisting discovery (seventh factor). To demonstrate hardship, the banks needed to show there was a possibility of civil punishment, criminal punishment, or both if they were forced to comply with the subpoena, and that the possibility was more than speculative. 107 The banks cited to two cases in which BOC had been punished for unintentionally disclosing information protected by banking privacy laws. 108 The plaintiffs argued these cases were not identical to the present case, but failed to provide any evidence of a Chinese bank complying with a United States court for disclosure of evidence without incurring consequences. 109 The court found the banks' argument more persuasive on this factor.
110
Since there was no evidence in the record of the banks acting in bad faith, the court also found the seventh and final factor (use of good faith) in favor of the banks. 111 Finding that the comity analysis on the whole weighed in favor of the banks, the court directed the plaintiffs to request evidence disclosure for the Chinese bank records through the Hague Evidence Convention, and if such request proved futile, plaintiffs would then be able to "renew their application to enforce their subpoenas." In this case, the court also conducted the seven-factor comity analysis to determine whether BOC would be compelled to produce evidence under the Federal Rules. For reasons similar to those used in Tiffany I, the court found the first factor (importance of documents to litigation) 116 and second factor (specificity of the request) 117 in favor of the plaintiffs, and the third factor (whether information originated in the United States) 118 and seventh factor (good faith) 119 in favor of BOC. The court's analysis of factors four, five, and six differed from Tiffany I and ultimately led to the opposite outcome.
In analyzing whether there was an alternative means for securing the information sought (fourth factor), the Gucci court rejected the Tiffany I court's standard that the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the Hague Evidence Convention would be "futile."
120 Instead, the court, citing language from Aerospatiale, required that BOC show a Hague Evidence Convention request would be "effective."
121 In arguing its case, BOC again pointed to the removal of the language quoted in Tiffany I from the State Department's website, and similar statistics on the execution of Hague Evidence Convention requests in China. 122 The court, however, reviewed prior jurisprudence on requests under the Hague Evidence Convention in the Southern District of New York and concluded the general opinion was that such requests were prone to indefinite delays and uncertain to ever be executed. 123 In addition, while the expert opinions provided by the plaintiffs cited the language from the State Department website, the court found the opinions sufficiently relied on other sources of information to support their conclusions. 124 Therefore, the court did not find the unexplained removal of the language from the State Department's website persuasive, and found the fourth factor in favor of the plaintiffs.
125
In balancing the national interests of the United States and China (fifth factor), the Gucci court also differed from Tiffany I by finding the interests of enforcing United States law more significant. 126 In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that Chinese banking secrecy laws could be waived by a number of entities and thus resembled more of an "individual privilege" for customers rather than "a national policy entitled to substantial deference."
127 According to the court, the Chinese government's failure to object to disclosure in the case only highlighted the lack of a significant national interest. 128 The United States' interest in enforcing its intellectual property laws thus outweighed any nominal interest China might have in its banking secrecy laws.
129
The final factor in which the Gucci court disagreed with Tiffany I was hardship of compliance (sixth factor). BOC again cited two cases in which it had been punished for unintentionally disclosing client information. 130 The court found the cases to be inapposite as they did not involve requests for evidence disclosure by a foreign court.
131
In addition, BOC was unable to cite to any instance of a Chinese bank being punished for complying with a foreign request for evidence disclosure.
132
Because there was no definitive evidence that BOC would be punished for complying with the subpoena, the Gucci court found the threat of sanction too speculative and found for the plaintiffs. 134 In analyzing the fourth factor (availability of alternative means), the court noted that the Supreme Court in Aerospatiale had advised courts to "demonstrate due respect for any special problem confronted by the foreign litigant on account of its nationality or the location of its operations, and for any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state." 135 In arguing their positions, both sides again cited the statistics from the MOJ website, and the plaintiffs pointed out that over six months had passed since the Tiffany I court had transmitted a Hague Evidence Convention request, and China had yet to respond.
136
The banks, however, were also able to submit a letter from two Chinese financial regulatory bodies, the People's Bank of China (PBOC), and the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), addressed to four judges in the Southern District of New York. 137 The letter stated that the banks are prohibited by Chinese law from disclosing customer account information in response to a United States court order.
138 Therefore, they asked the judges to require parties to request such information through the Hague Evidence Convention procedures.
139
The letter also expressed that the PBOC and CBRC "are committed to actively coordinating with the PRC Ministry of Justice and judicial organs in the PRC to ensure that they satisfy that requests for seeking evidence under the Hague Convention within a reasonable time period and by following the procedures thereunder."
140 Because the Chinese government had expressed willingness to cooperate and the statistics provided by both sides remained speculative, the court decided the best option was to "forebear from assuming that the Hague Convention is not a viable option until Chinese authorities have had a meaningful opportunity to comply with similar requests but have failed to do so." 
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For the fifth factor (balancing national interests), the court found the United States' interest in enforcing its intellectual property laws in balance with Chinese interests in upholding its bank secrecy laws.
142 It also agreed with the Gucci court and found the possibility of sanctions (sixth factor-hardship) to be too speculative in this case, specifically noting that the large ownership interest of the Chinese government in each of the banks would be a disincentive to any governmental regulatory actions. 143 It ultimately ordered discovery under the Hague Evidence Convention for CMB and ICBC, but ordered discovery under the Federal Rules for BOC because the bank had acted in bad faith. 144 
III. ANALYSIS
The comity analysis as applied to non-party Chinese banks in these cases reveals a number of problems, particularly in the Gucci case. The cases since Aerospatiale fall into a general trend in which courts demonstrate a pro-forum bias, often choosing to compel evidence disclosure under the Federal Rules even when doing so would violate foreign law. 145 The courts were also placed in a position to weigh United States and Chinese sovereign interests. 146 Despite these issues, the outcome in the Tiffany cases provided the most even-handed approach to evidence disclosure from China: providing the Chinese government a chance to comply with the Hague Evidence Convention before turning to the Federal Rules.
A. Current Comity Analysis in the Wake of Aerospatiale
The use of the seven-factor comity analysis resulted in two different outcomes in the above cases: giving China the chance to comply with the Hague Evidence Convention procedures before resorting to the Federal Rules in the Tiffany cases, and granting a motion to compel evidence disclosure under the Federal Rules in Gucci. 147 records. 148 The current method of comity analysis used in these cases has a number of flaws which allowed for such disparate outcomes. First, the current method of analysis allows courts to show an unfounded preference for United States' interests and the Federal Rules when weighing factors.
149 This is particularly problematic when looking at cases that require a non-party to violate a foreign law in order to comply with a United States court order. Additionally, this method also allows for outcomes to be unduly influenced by attitudes toward the Chinese legal and banking systems. 
Pro-Forum Bias and Criticism of Aerospatiale
The minority in Aerospatiale predicted the new rule created by the case would be susceptible to a "pro-forum bias," and courts would often resort to more familiar local rules rather than those of the Hague Evidence Convention.
151 Consistent with this prediction, a pro-forum bias has been the general trend of court decisions after Aerospatiale with many lower courts failing to give the laws and interests of foreign states the weight they may deserve. 152 The issue has even been recognized by the American Bar Association (ABA), which issued a resolution in 2012 urging United States courts to show greater deference to data protection and privacy laws of foreign sovereigns in discovery requests in civil litigation.
153
In its resolution, the ABA noted that forcing parties to choose between violating foreign law or noncompliance with a United States discovery order "is inconsistent with promotion of rule of law, as it facilitates violation of law, either abroad or here." 154 The resolution specifically addresses the analysis of foreign banking privacy laws, finding that while some United States courts have recognized the validity of a foreign state's interest in enforcing banking privacy laws, those The Tiffany and Gucci cases follow in this trend. Rather than acknowledge that the existence of multiple Chinese regulations on the disclosure of deposit account information expresses the will of the Chinese government regarding bank privacy issues, all three cases looked to whether the Chinese government specifically objected to the particular request for evidence disclosure. 157 In Tiffany II, the objection of two Chinese financial regulatory bodies helped push the analysis in favor of a request under the Hague Evidence Convention. 158 In Gucci, the absence of any objection swayed the analysis in favor of the Federal Rules. 159 Interestingly, the PBOC and CBRC eventually issued a letter objecting to the discovery requests at issue in Gucci. 160 The regulatory organs stated that they had issued a "severe warning" to BOC and were investigating BOC to determine the severity of the violation and the appropriate sanctions. 161 While the court did not admit this letter as evidence in a later proceeding, it noted that even if evidence of the warning and investigation were admitted, it would not change the outcome of the analysis. 162 Even though BOC had been warned and was under investigation, the PBOC and CBRC had not yet imposed sanctions or determined that BOC would definitely face sanctions, so the threat of punishment was still "unduly speculative." 163 law to comply with the order of a United States court) in a precarious position-the only way they can prove they will be sanctioned is if they are actually sanctioned first.
164
These cases also took note of any exceptions to the rule and the ability of governmental entities to waive secrecy, even coming to opposite conclusions despite analyzing the same law. The Tiffany I court concluded that Chinese banking privacy laws had few exceptions and harsh penalties, supporting the court's decision to proceed with discovery under the Hague Evidence Convention. 165 The Gucci court found that the waivers and exceptions included in the banking privacy laws demonstrated that banking privacy was not of significant national interest to China, which helped push the court towards use of the Federal Rules. 166 The Tiffany II court, while giving deference to the Chinese government's intervention, still "question[ed] the true extent of the Chinese interests at stake in [the] matter." 167 The court noted that the laws most certainly were not intended to protect counterfeiters, which was underscored by the number of Chinese governmental organs that may override banking secrecy provisions. 172 This is in especially stark contrast to the language used in Gucci, which found that China's banking secrecy laws were a customer privilege rather than a significant national interest.
173
In addition to this double standard, the cases involving Chinese banks also spent a great deal of time trying to assess whether China would execute requests under the Hague Evidence Convention-a question that was not even raised in the Swiss bank cases. 174 The authors suggest this is because the court "found it unthinkable that the Swiss government would not comply with the Hague Convention." 175 Nor did any of the courts consider an intrusion on Chinese sovereignty as something that should necessarily be avoided. These comparisons are not meant to be an exhaustive study of the ways in which the Southern District of New York has analyzed foreign states' interests in their banking privacy laws. They can provide some light, though, as to the particular attitudes of the courts in the Tiffany and Gucci cases regarding China's sovereign interests.
These issues come on top of the serious criticism the Aerospatiale ruling has faced since being handed down. Two years after the ruling, the Hague Conference issued a Special Commission Report on the operation of the Hague Evidence Convention. 176 The report acknowledged that contracting states disagreed as to whether the The Commission noted, however, that given the object of the Convention, first priority should be given to the Convention procedures regardless of whether a state regarded such procedures as exclusive.
178
In addition, most American commentary on the Aerospatiale ruling has also been highly critical both of the decision itself, and of its failure to provide clearer guidelines to lower courts. 179 One scholar called the ruling a "disappointment" 180 for failing to adopt a rule of first resort to the Hague Evidence Convention in the interest of international comity.
181
Another asserted the Aerospatiale ruling "create[ed] an undesirable and unworkable framework in which lower courts must make determinations about the appropriate use of the [Hague Convention] ." 182 A third stated that by failing to create an appropriate analytical framework, the decision "threaten[ed] to lead to conceptual chaos and may exacerbate rather than reduce current conflicts."
183 This is certainly not a comprehensive list of American criticism of the Aerospatiale ruling. These commentaries do, however, show a common concern: that the case was decided wrongly and, at the very least, has left lower courts with a confusing and unworkable standard by which to determine whether to carry out foreign discovery under the Federal Rules or the Hague Evidence Convention.
On the other hand, one particularly persuasive student note points out that the Aerospatiale decision should be credited with creating a rule of law in an area in which none existed before. 184 While not specifically stated in the opinion, the Supreme Court may have had several important
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American interests in mind in making its decision. 185 First, the Court may have concluded that the United States entered into the Hague Evidence Convention with the purpose of creating an international system of discovery more like the American system. 186 Second, United States courts had been conducting extraterritorial discovery under the Federal Rules for some time, and there is little to suggest that the United States government wanted to limit this practice.
187 Last, and perhaps most significantly, the Court may have been attempting to protect the ability of United States courts to fairly adjudicate claims.
188
While these interests are important considerations, they fail to support the Aerospatiale decision and the resulting framework as a whole. The Hague Evidence Convention is widely understood as an instrument designed to bridge the gap between common law (specifically American) discovery procedures and civil law evidence disclosure. 189 Thus, by entering into the Convention, the United States was offering a compromise in the way its courts and litigants conducted discovery in signatory countries. Second, use of the Hague Evidence Convention does not necessarily preclude the fair adjudication of claims in United States courts. 190 Additionally, while the adjudication of claims is of utmost importance to United States courts, discovery abroad implicates other United States and foreign interests which must be considered in reaching a solution. . Fourteen of thirty respondents were able to obtain all the documents requested, while eighteen of thirty indicated the evidence obtained had an impact on the resolution of the case. Id. at 6, 9. While sixty percent of respondents felt their experience was not as satisfactory as expected, seventy-three percent reported they were "glad" they had used the Convention procedures and would use them again in similar circumstances. Id. at 6. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 been primarily concerned with obtaining the testimony of witnesses outside the forum court's jurisdiction, although the final draft did not limit the convention's scope on this issue. 191 Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling in Aerospatiale, several United States courts held that the Hague Evidence Convention would only apply in cases where production of evidence was requested from an entity who was neither a party to the lawsuit nor subject to the court's jurisdiction. 192 The Aerospatiale opinion, however, held that the Hague Evidence Convention procedures would be available for evidence obtained from non-parties or litigants because the text of the Convention drew no distinction between the two. 193 Despite the Court's ruling, some cases have again begun to recognize the significance of the status of the entity requesting use of the Hague Evidence Convention, at least when such requests are due to banking privacy laws or blocking statutes. 194 Courts are more likely to compel discovery through the Federal Rules if the party is a litigant. 195 This makes sense because a litigant requesting use of the Hague Evidence Convention is either a plaintiff seeking the benefits of United States law while attempting to block discovery, or a defendant who may have violated United States law. 196 However, a non-party requesting the use of the Hague Evidence Convention does not raise these concerns.
When non-parties are ordered to produce evidence, it "raises both questions of jurisdictional power (whether the United States court has the authority to compel production pursuant to United States rules) and system concerns (in that this type of order would seem particularly offensive to the host state involved)."
197 Because many such cases involve a non-party under the control of a litigant (e.g., a foreign
2014]
A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO COMPLY 215 subsidiary of a corporation located in the United States), courts may more readily resolve the issue in favor of the use of the Federal Rules on jurisdictional grounds. 198 Cases involving a non-party not under the control of a litigant, however, will raise different system-based concerns. 199 As one court noted, civil law nations regard discovery within their borders as a violation of their sovereignty because factgathering is the responsibility of judges in their legal system. 200 These orders are "particularly offensive" in cases where the entity being ordered to produce evidence is a non-party to the suit. 201 Here, courts are left to decide how best to balance the parties' as well as the sovereigns' interests, which can lead to disparate outcomes in similar cases. 202 While recent cases involving non-parties have been inconsistent in their findings, 203 courts have developed a general rule that use of the Hague Evidence Convention is mandatory when ordering discovery from a nonparty. 204 Both Tiffany cases continued in this development by acknowledging the significance of the bank's status as a non-party. In Tiffany I, the court found "the Banks' status as non-parties . . . attenuate[d] the United States interest in enforcing discovery obligations." 205 Tiffany II also came to the same conclusion, citing Tiffany I. 206 The Gucci court, on the other hand, failed to adequately take account of BOC's non-party status. 207 This likely made use of the Federal Rules more probable, because the court did not consider the sovereign interests involved in ordering discovery from a non-party located in a civil law jurisdiction. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63
In addition, by failing to recognize the banks' non-party status, the court "seemed to project some culpability on the bank." 208 While the issue of non-party status may not be dispositive, 209 it weighs heavily in favor of use of the Hague Evidence Convention because of the lack of involvement of non-parties in the suit and the sovereign interests at stake.
Another key consideration is the nature of the claim being brought and the subsequent interests that claim implicates. Both the Tiffany and Gucci cases were civil suits targeted at counterfeiters violating American trademark law. Counterfeiting is undoubtedly a problem, both in the United States and worldwide. By some estimates, counterfeiting is worth $600 billion a year, constituting five to seven percent of world trade. 210 China holds a special position in the counterfeiting trade, standing as the world's top manufacturer and exporter of counterfeit goods. 211 China has, in recent years, made great strides in its protection of intellectual property rights.
Chinese law provides a number of domestic enforcement methods, including special courts that deal exclusively with intellectual property cases. 212 In addition, China has become party to a number of international treaties that obligate it to bring itself in line with international standards on intellectual property rights. 213 Regardless of these developments, though, counterfeiting in China continues to be a problem for American businesses.
Courts have routinely recognized the importance of enforcing American trademark laws in order to combat counterfeiting. The Tiffany and Gucci cases all acknowledged that the United States has a strong interest in protecting its trademark laws. 214 acknowledged the enforcement of trademark laws as a public interest issue because of the harm done to consumers by counterfeit goods.
215
Despite this, the interest in enforcing intellectual property rights does not invoke the same public interests as other types of cases. For one, trademark cases generally involve private parties rather than the United States government. 216 Second, the interest in protecting trademark laws is not as compelling as other interests, which implicate public safety concerns, such as terrorism.
217
A recent case involving BOC, Wultz v. Bank of China, addressed the issue of compelling discovery in order to combat terrorism. 218 In Wultz, family members of a victim of a terrorist bombing brought suit against BOC for its alleged involvement in the financing of terrorism. 219 As in the Tiffany and Gucci cases, BOC requested the use of the Hague Evidence Convention for discovery in China.
220
In balancing the sovereign interests of the United States and China, the Southern District of New York found that when the fight against terrorism is combined with the need of United States courts to fully and fairly adjudicate cases, the "U.S. interest is elevated to nearly its highest point, and diminishes any competing interests of the foreign state." 221 The court ultimately ordered discovery under the Federal Rules.
222
The decision in Wultz is understandable given the threat to public safety and United States sovereignty that terrorism poses. Counterfeiting, on the other hand, may be a multi-billion dollar a year business, but it does not implicate the same public safety issues as 23, 2012 Tiffany I and II came to the most workable conclusion when dealing with evidence disclosure in China: allowing China a chance to execute a letter of request through the Hague Evidence Convention before resorting to the Federal Rules. This holding adequately takes into account China's sovereign interests without being overly deferential to a legal system that has less transparency than many modern nation-states. The holding in Tiffany I and II also acknowledges China's explicit commitment to complying with the Hague Evidence Convention and provides a better response to inconclusive evidence on China's history of executing Hague Evidence Convention requests. The ruling adequately accounts for the banks' status as non-parties and the nature of the suit being brought. It also serves the long-term interests of the United States by working to improve the often-tense relations between the United States and China. Thus, the approach used in the Tiffany cases would serve the interests of both the United States and China while still providing viable means of evidence disclosure for litigants.
Professor James Feinerman of Georgetown Law School also confirmed that China's banking privacy laws were created to instill "confidence in a relatively new banking system and to '[e]ncourag[e] its citizens who had historically been skeptical about the safety of their deposits in banksand their continued access to them-[to utilize Chinese banks by providing] the strongest possible assurances of confidentiality.'" 226 Having a "relatively new banking system" means China has had fewer chances to enforce its laws against violators, and the Chinese government has had fewer chances to express its national interest in lawsuits involving these laws. Yet, these are the exact factors courts analyze in determining the weight of a sovereign's interest and the hardship of compliance for a non-party compelled to disclose evidence.
The holding in the Tiffany cases also recognizes China's commitment to the Hague Evidence Convention and better conforms to China's decisions to integrate the Hague Evidence Convention into domestic law. By signing the Hague Evidence Convention, the Chinese government has already expressed its intention to abide by the rules therein. The Civil Procedure Law essentially makes the Hague Evidence Convention the mandatory procedure for foreign states collecting evidence within China. 227 The Provisions on Judicial Assistance also explicitly state that the Hague Evidence Convention is the method by which China will conduct evidence disclosure in foreign countries. 228 Specifically regarding litigation related to banking and finance, both the PBOC and the CBRC have expressed their willingness to assist in the KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 execution of requests through the Hague Evidence Convention for banking records kept in China. 229 These factors combined, show a willingness on the part of the Chinese government to abide by the provisions of the Hague Evidence Convention.
The approach used in the Tiffany cases also deals better with the inconclusive nature of the evidence regarding the execution of Hague Evidence Convention requests in China. China was faulted for having inadequate information regarding its compliance with Hague Evidence Convention requests, yet it is by no means unique in this regard. In 2003 and 2008, the Hague Conference issued questionnaires regarding the execution of Hague Evidence Convention requests. 230 The PRC did not respond to either questionnaire, but the information for a number of other states is available, including the United States. 231 In its response to the questionnaire, the United States claimed it had no system for keeping track of how many Hague Evidence Convention letters of request were actually executed. 232 The United States also claimed that letters of request can take anywhere from one month to two years to execute.
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Given that the United States was unable to provide accurate statistics on the number of requests executed and the average length of time for execution, faulting China for the same lack of information hardly seems appropriate. And while China admittedly did not respond to the questionnaires, the Chinese legal system has been developing rapidly in the past few years. Penalizing China for omissions from several years ago is hardly the best course of action.
Furthermore, China has spent "the past thirty years . . . engaged in what is perhaps the most rapid development of any legal system in the history of the world." 234 Given this state of affairs, the likelihood that China would have had inconclusive statistics on its history of executing requests is not entirely surprising. However, a number of reforms suggest China may now be better equipped to deal with the execution of Hague requests.
Chinese reforms have led to increased professionalization with better legal education systems, more "legally-trained personnel," and higher professional and educational standards for judges. 235 Legislation has shifted its focus from economic development to cover a wider range of topics, including public and private law. 236 Additionally, many of China's legal reforms "have sought to bring China into line with international practice."
237 Given China's unique position as a developing state with a rapidly developing legal system, courts should not continue to punish China for problems related to its legal system without conclusive evidence of their existence and without ever giving China a chance to rectify those problems. The only way China can fall in line with international practices under the Hague Evidence Convention is if it is given the chance to do so.
How the Hague Evidence Convention Can Benefit the United States
The Hague Evidence Convention is also better suited to bridge gaps between United States and Chinese law. The purpose of the Hague Evidence Convention was to eliminate conflicts between common law countries like the United States and civil law countries like China.
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While the Convention may have been aimed specifically at evidentiary law, it can also help to address other conflicts-of-law issues like those seen in Tiffany I, Tiffany 240 Because certain Chinese government authorities (but not foreign courts) can waive bank secrecy laws and collect otherwise confidential information, the use of the Hague Evidence Convention provides a way to legally collect the information plaintiffs need. 241 If forced to produce evidence under the Federal Rules, however, Chinese banks would be forced to make a choice between noncompliance with a United States court order or risk incurring penalties under Chinese law. As noted in the ABA resolution, such a choice is inconsistent with the general promotion of the rule of law. 242 Forcing Chinese non-parties to make such a Hobson's choice also works against many of the United States' long-term interests. While the United States has a significant short-term interest in the quick and fair adjudication of suits brought in its courts, it also has a substantial longterm interest in "[furthering and maintaining] the climate of cooperation and goodwill necessary to the functioning of the international legal and commercial systems."
243 By failing to show due respect for the laws of foreign sovereigns, United States courts work against broader United States' interests in this area generally. A lack of respect for China's sovereign interests places strain on the United States' already tense political and economic relations with China specifically. Furthermore, forcing Chinese banks to produce evidence in violation of Chinese law could also discourage Chinese banks or other businesses from setting up in the United States out of fear that United States court orders would force them to violate either domestic or foreign law. 244 At the same time, United States courts should not forsake the interests of American parties in order to defer to the sovereign interests of states whose legal systems are not particularly transparent. If a state's legal system has serious transparency issues and well-established problems executing Hague Evidence Convention requests, United States courts should not have to continue resorting to the Hague Evidence Convention for evidence disclosure as a first resort. Thus, a bright-line rule of first resort may not be an ideal resolution to the problems created by the Aerospatiale ruling.
China admittedly does have some transparency issues, but has made significant strides in bringing its legal system in line with international standards. 245 In such a situation, the holding in the Tiffany cases represents a fair compromise between the interests of a developed state like the United States and a developing state like China.
The Tiffany cases' rulings could also be used to cure a number of common criticisms of post-Aerospatiale jurisprudence. It eliminates the pro-forum bias in court decisions, which has come in the wake of the Aerospatiale ruling and has been roundly criticized. The ruling is also in line with the Hague Conference's recommendation that use of the Convention should be a first priority in the courts of contracting states. 246 Furthermore, it provides a standard to apply in similar cases, removing the confusion and uncertainty which currently reign in this area. This is not to say that the analysis in Tiffany I and Tiffany II was without issue. The court still looked to the frequency of sanctions for violating banking secrecy laws in determining China's national interests and the hardship of compliance for the bank. 247 As noted above, however, if China's banking system is relatively new and the legal system is still developing, the record of enforcement may be scant. This places the banks in the position of having to be sanctioned in order to prove they will be sanctioned. 248 Moreover, Tiffany II also held that because of large state ownership interests in the banks, it was unlikely that the banks would be sanctioned by the government. 249 This was in spite of the fact that the banks were able to cite cases in which they had been already sanctioned for unintentionally violating bank secrecy laws. 250 Despite these issues, the Tiffany cases were still able to reach an KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63
outcome that best balanced the interests of the sovereigns and parties involved.
Guidelines for Compliance
In order to protect the United States' interest in fully and fairly adjudicating cases, courts should adopt some guidelines in determining whether China has complied with a Hague Evidence Convention request. Two key factors in determining if a request has been successful are the time taken to execute the request and the quality and quantity of the documents produced. 251 According to the Report of the Special Commission on the Operation of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, the average time taken to execute a letter of request internationally was between one to six months. 252 This average is consistent with a survey of American attorneys who reported the majority of their letters of request had been executed within six months. 253 Since the MOJ reported that the average time taken to execute requests in China was six to twelve months, 254 six months should be a workable time frame for China to execute its requests.
China will also need to produce documents of a certain quality and quantity to demonstrate compliance. China's reservation to the Hague Evidence Convention does put limits on what documents the MOJ will produce. 255 However, this should not necessarily entitle them to refuse to produce documents relevant to United States litigation. When the court in Tiffany I evaluated the success of the letter of request sent under the Hague Evidence Convention, the court determined the request had not been "futile" because the documents produced had disclosed important information. 256 A general guideline, then, for production of documents is 2014] A MEANINGFUL OPPORTUNITY TO COMPLY 225 whether the documents produced disclosed information important to the litigation. If China fails to produce relevant documents or does not do so within the allotted timeframe, courts can then compel disclosure through the Federal Rules.
IV. CONCLUSION
While some transparency issues remain regarding the judicial assistance and evidence disclosure process in China, the rapid development of the Chinese legal system and the absence of any reliable statistics on execution make accurate determinations of the treatment of Hague Evidence Convention requests difficult. With the increasing commercial interaction between the United States and China, litigation between the states is almost certain to increase. Thus, courts need to have some guiding principle to deal with the rapidly changing state of Chinese law, as well as other nations in China's position.
The Tiffany cases' holdings, that China should be given a chance to execute a letter of request under the Hague Evidence Convention before resorting to the Federal Rules, is the best resolution of the issues presented in these cases. It balances the short-term interests of the United States in adjudication with China's sovereign interests as well as the United States' own long-term interests in international cooperation. The holding also provides an ideal way of dealing with the rapidly changing state of the Chinese legal system by giving China the chance to comply with international standards of practice. Adding some new guidelines on what China must do to comply with Hague Evidence Convention requests will help litigants know what to expect in cases, while upholding the interests of both the parties and sovereigns involved.
